Bitcoin Lightning developers needed two patches to stop a potentially costly attack
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Bitcoin Lightning developers needed two patches to stop a potentially costly attack

The initial July update blocked one crash method but missed a persistent vulnerability that could leave affected nodes unable to restart.

Quick Take

  1. Core Lightning's first security patch failed to eliminate a vulnerability that could repeatedly crash Bitcoin payment nodes.
  2. Attackers could exploit duplicate channel identifiers to keep nodes offline, potentially exposing Bitcoin held in unrelated payment channels.
  3. A second patch closed the remaining attack route in September, but operators running outdated software remain exposed.

Bitcoin's Core Lightning software required two security patches to eliminate a vulnerability that could repeatedly crash payment nodes and potentially expose funds held in other channels.

A Nov. 13 security disclosure revealed that an initial repair released in July failed to address a second attack method that could keep affected nodes offline even after they restarted.

The vulnerability, tracked as LNF-2026-0004, affected Core Lightning, one of the software implementations used to operate nodes on Bitcoin's Lightning Network.

Security researcher Nishant Bansal discovered that attackers could exploit how Core Lightning assigned identifiers to payment channels, creating duplicate records that caused the software to crash.

The weakness originated in the network's channel-opening process, where each payment channel receives an identifier derived from the Bitcoin transaction output that funds it. Core Lightning could accept multiple channels referencing the same funding output, producing identical identifiers that conflicted with assumptions in its internal software.

In the first attack, a malicious peer could create duplicate pending channels and crash a victim's node simply by reconnecting. The attack required no Bitcoin transaction fees because the fraudulent channels did not need on-chain funding. Each subsequent reconnection could trigger another crash, allowing attackers to repeatedly interrupt payment processing.

However, researchers identified a more persistent variation involving previously closed channels.

By reusing an identifier associated with a closed channel and subsequently closing another channel with the same identifier, attackers could trigger a software failure that persisted across restarts.

Unlike the initial attack, this method required on-chain transaction fees but could leave the node unable to recover without a software upgrade.

Why Core Lightning's first security patch failed

Core Lightning developers addressed the original vulnerability in version 26.06.6, released on July 22, after researchers privately reported the reconnection attack earlier that month.

The update prevented new channels from reusing funding outputs associated with existing live channels. It also modified connection handling to prevent duplicate records already stored from triggering the original crash.

However, the protection did not extend to identifiers associated with closed channels, leaving the second attack route available.

Researcher Crypt-iQ independently identified the remaining weakness, prompting developers to introduce broader safeguards in version 26.06.8, released Sept. 22.

The second update expanded duplicate-identifier checks across active and closed channels belonging to different peers. It also allowed nodes containing previously stored duplicate records to recover without repeatedly crashing.

One reused output. A fix that missed closed channels.

July’s repair checked live channels. September’s also covered closed channels and allowed recovery from duplicates already stored.

Explore the two repairs

The first fix blocked outpoints reused among that peer’s live channels and handled reconnect duplicates. Closed-channel collisions could still cause a persistent restart loop.

Operators should upgrade to the latest release to prevent collisions and handle stored duplicates.

The closed-channel loop shown is the documented persistent path; a separate free nonpersistent path also existed. This qualitative schematic does not show exploitation, losses or affected-node counts.

The potential financial consequences extended beyond disrupted Lightning payments.

According to the advisory, nodes forced offline could lose the ability to monitor Bitcoin's blockchain for attempts to settle channels using revoked transaction states.

That could allow dishonest counterparties to claim funds using outdated channel balances. Offline nodes could also miss deadlines for collecting time-sensitive payments, placing Bitcoin held in unrelated channels at risk.

The researchers did not report confirmed exploitation or financial losses.

The findings affect Core Lightning versions preceding the complete September repair, with the reconnection vulnerability dating back to version 0.12.0 and the persistent closed-channel crash introduced in version 25.05.

Related Reading

Bitcoin Lightning developers patch bug that could make completed payments disappear

Developers have since released additional security updates, including version 26.06.10, which addresses other vulnerabilities involving channel operations, payment resolution, and remote crashes.

Core Lightning's maintainers have urged operators to upgrade to the latest release to protect their nodes against the disclosed weaknesses.

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